Washington Post, 3 July 2010: The Russian spy case that exploded into public view this week was preceded by nearly a decade of cat-and-mouse activities with the FBI, according to court documents and an interview with a senior U.S. official familiar with the case. . . . . A close examination of court documents indicates that by mid-2006 investigators had already searched the homes of four of the couples, planted microphones in at least three of their residences, regularly reviewed their encrypted computer messages, and videotaped meetings where money and equipment were exchanged . . . .
. . . . . Indeed, the investigation into the 11 alleged foreign agents appears to have been a case study in counterintelligence. As a matter of technique, the FBI and the CIA generally weigh the opportunity of gaining valuable counterintelligence against the danger of allowing subjects of interest to continue operating, lest they obtain U.S. intelligence or manage to flee.
In the Russian spy case, the counterintelligence gains could have included the names of Russian couriers and spy handlers, the names of Americans whom the Russians had sought to recruit, or knowledge of Russian espionage techniques and practices that could be employed in counterintelligence activities elsewhere in the world.
Already, the FBI has revealed enough information about the suspects to indicate that it may have gained valuable counterintelligence about Moscow’s spy operations. According to a Justice Department letter filed in U.S. District Court in New York, for example, the FBI has acquired and decrypted more than 100 messages exchanged between one couple, Richard and Cynthia Murphy, and the SVR, the Russian spy agency. Only about 10 of those messages were described in the criminal complaint against the Murphys, who reside in New Jersey.
Separately, the Yonkers, N.Y., apartment of Vicky Peleaz, a columnist for New York’s El Diario La Prensa, and Juan Jose Lazaro, a political science professor, was bugged in February 2002. Yet in court papers the Justice Department described only five conversations recorded inside the apartment over the intervening years. . . . .
. . . . . Since the arrests were announced, many observers have expressed puzzlement as to why spies would live, say, in Yonkers or work in real estate. But counterintelligence experts say the suspects’ chief role probably was as “spotters,” as they are known in the intelligence world. A spotter would select individuals who could be recruited to work for Russia, either through persuasion or entrapment.
[Agent-Navodchik – Talent-Spotting Agent
Intelligence service agent used to identify individuals in a target country who may be of interest as potential candidates for recruitments, to carry out an initial assessment and to create suitable conditions for an intelligence officer to make contact with them. Talent-spotting agents are recruited from people whose job or social position gives them the opportunity to have contact with the kinds of people in whom the intelligence service is interested. More SVR terms]
They were in “a good position for spotting possible recruitment targets for Russian intelligence,” Peter Earnest, a former CIA officer and now executive director of the International Spy Museum, said in a recent Washington Post online chat.
In a 2004 message, court papers say, Heathfield sent an encrypted message in which he spoke of making contact with a U.S. government employee who worked at a research facility and dealt with planning related to nuclear weapons development. A year after the search of Heathfield’s house, the FBI was able to intercept an SVR message to him reporting Moscow’s response to his presentation of potential sources.
“Agree with your proposal to use ‘Farmer’ to start building a network of students in D.C.,” the SVR wrote him, according to the court papers. The SVR went on: “Your relationship with ‘Parrot’ looks very promising as a valid source of info from US power circles. To start working on him professionally we need all available details on his background, current position, habits, contacts, opportunities, etc.” The personal information about “Parrot” would, in the normal course of the counterintelligence trade, be turned over to a trained recruiter in Russia who would “work on him professionally” — using Moscow Center’s terms. . . . .
CI CENTRE
We’re seeing some remarkable ignorance in the media concerning the Russian Illegals case. Partly it is because the nature of Illegals is so unknown. It is not the typical spy case where an American is arrested for spying for Russia (like CIA officer Aldrich Ames or FBI Supervisory Special Agent Robert Hanssen). Yet the Russians have used the methodology of Illegals since the beginning of the 20th century as a way to operate more freely and widely, and identify and recruit people to spy for Russia.
The dismissing of this case as ‘old Cold War mentality’ shows a lack seeing the true picture. The Cold War ended in 1991 and the West naively thought it was the end of hostilities, the end of history and Russia was no longer a threat. We let our guard down in thinking that spying by Russia and against Russia was over.
This Illegals case shows that many of the Illegals were inserted and became operational during that same period in the 1990s after the Cold War ended. Who retained the ‘Cold War mentality’? The US stopped considering Russia a target or a threat while the Russians CONTINUED to see the US as a target and a threat. (KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin said the term went from calling the US the “Number One Target” to the “Number One Priority.” Not much difference.
Is American supposed to not care that highly-trained Russian intelligence officers have been directed by the SVR (“The Agency Formerly Known as the KGB”) to embed and ingrain themselves into American society since the US and Russia are now ‘friends’, ‘allies’, ‘partners’? Is the FBI supposed to ignore foreign intelligence officers operating in the America because the US maintains good relations with that foreign country?
Countries don’t have friends, they have interests.
Many have misinterpreted the mission of the Illegals. “Why have they been sent here to collect information that can easily be collected by reading the newspaper?” An Illegal’s mission is far more than that. Illegals talent-spot recruitments and are able to handle agents when a SVR intelligence officer is unable to because of limitations (watched by the FBI, etc).
Consider one example: One of the SVR Illegals ‘Donald Heathfield’ ran a software company called Future Maps that helps map a picture of anticipated future events. Their website said the users of the software are “business leaders, corporate strategists, financial analysts, government officials and researchers.” On their employment page, they advertised for Future Map Interns:
“Future Map offers internships to undergraduate and graduate students specializing in International Relations, Government, Computer Science and other disciplines, who have an interest in future-related issues and would like to contribute to this field of knowledge using revolutionary, cutting edge methodologies.”
What an excellent strategy for making contact with the kind of people the SVR has interest in for either immediate recruitment or in the case of interns, long-term recruitment! The Illegal makes a relationship with the intern now, maintains contact over the years, and later the intern may become employed as a staff employee or a contractor in the State Department, CIA, or the Department of Defense working on computer or network security, or maybe as a policy analyst. When the intern is now in a favorable position, the Illegal taps his friend for some help, advice, assistance, “can you do me a favor?” or puts the intern in contact with another SVR officer to perhaps pursue formal recruitment.
Collecting policymaking information that could easily have been obtained through reading the newspaper is the LEAST of it. ‘Donald Heathfield’s’ intern could eventually become the POLICYMAKER, making official United States policy. While US intelligence has never had much patience with long-term penetrations, the Russians and Chinese have and will wait a long time for their work to finally pay off.
Agent Vliyaniya – Agent of Infuence
“An agent operating under intelligence instructions who uses his official or public position, and other means, to exert influence on policy, public opinion, the course of particular events, the activity of political organizations and state agencies in target countries.” – KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook
, edited by KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin, 2002. (Dictionary of intelligence terms written by Russian intelligence)
The other trend seen in media reporting and commenting on this Illegals case is dismissing, making fun of or considering as irrelevant ‘quaint or old fashioned Cold War-era’ tradecraft conducted by the Illegals. This shows a tremendous lack of knowledge and understanding of intelligence tradecraft and it is offensive to intelligence professionals.
The intelligence tradecraft used by the Illegals are not techniques confined to the period of the Cold War. They are techniques used well before the Cold War started and will continue to be used well after. One legendary case officer said these techniques are “about 2,000-5,000 years old and it is that old because it is like the Energizer Bunny… It keeps on working and working and working and…”
We don’t want you to be disappointed if you ever join an intelligence agency to become a case officer (also known as operations officer) because guess what, you will learn these classic intelligence tradecraft techniques and be drilled over and over in using them well.
And please, don’t keep referring to the Illegals case as ‘something out of a Cold War spy novel.’ Spy novels are fiction and the authors base their stories on non-fiction elements that are true. While spy novels are escapist fun, this Illegals case is hard wake-up call reality—the Russian intelligence services have continued to operate against the United States as they always have since all the way back to the 1920s. They operated against America during the entire period of World War Two when Russia was our ally against the Axis (VENONA decrypts of Russian intelligence cables show they had 250 spies working in the US Government, Congress, White House, media, industry, military, etc.). Russian intelligence operated against American during the Cold War period (1947-1991, 44 years) and they continue to operate against America now (1991-to present, almost 20 years).
Because this threat has been ignored as attention has been focused on terrorism and the jihadist threat, the Russian intelligence services have had a field day in this country. Luckily there are still elements in the government, like the FBI’s SVR and GRU squads, that maintain vigilance towards this threat while everyone else ignores it. To these elements we salute.
We asked other intelligence experts (who recruited and handled agents) to contribute their thoughts about the ignorance being displayed regarding Illegals and espionage tradecraft. Here are some of their comments, unedited:
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The media reaction and reporting that I have seen is yet another reminder of how shallow and naive our post Cold War media has become when it comes to understanding Russia and Russian espionage – if they ever did. Hard to understand how not just the media, but also our political leaders think that Vladimir Putin is really a “former” KGB agent and that democracy was really ever going to bloom over Moscow.
Today’s Russia feels a lot like the former Soviet Union and while much has actually changed, the KGB has only changed names – not tactics, strategy or targets. We have to remain the number one target for Russian intelligence no matter what name they go by. The use of illegals has long been a key part of their long term strategy again the US and the West.
When the media goes on and on about how they were not getting classified government information and where seemingly only picking up freely available information, they miss the entire point. These 11 illegals demonstrate more than either Hanssen or Ames how committed Russian intelligence is in a long term penetration of US society at all levels. For what gain, we can only speculate, but we know from past experience that illegals are planted for future use in case of war, to service other espionage agents who do have access to classified information, and to find ways inside US government agencies. Some are dismissing this threat as both inefficient and ineffective way to gain information. Again they miss the point. They should be feeling a cold chill as the awareness sinks in that the Cold War never ended in Yasenevo.
The fact that Russian intelligence continues to use illegals in 2010 is not a surprise nor is the US media’s reaction. You would hope that someone might get pissed off enough to really report this for what it is – first hand evidence that nothing has changed in Moscow but the names of the services. The Sword and the Shield is alive and apparently well these days.
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I am not surprised with the successful transition of the Russian intelligence apparatus in the United States with capabilities intact from the USSR to Russia and from KGB Directorate S Line N to SVR Directorate S Line N. As you well know, the investment necessary to create and then support a network of illegals of this magnitude would be enormous measured in man-years vice hours. The good news is, all of that investment was just flushed down the drain.
The identified methodologies and targeting requirements indicate a healthy understanding of the employment practices of the US Govt, to include background checks is sobering. The individual operational requirements of each identified illegal, are easily brushed aside as similar to that of a lobbyist – and that is where the error in analyzing what has occurred takes place – these individuals were to be in position to both monitor and report, as well as influence and direct.
See this interview of Alexander Kouzimnov which discusses the role of Directorate S and Line N.
——————————The ill-informed media forget that a few years ago many were calling for more NOCs among our own ops officers. Illegals or NOCs have very unique qualities and opportunities. They frequently are the spotters and assessors of targets that will than have official cover officers approach. They can be invaluable is handling important agents who have already been recruited and thoroughly tested. This is to protect the agent from possibly being linked to an intel officer under official cover who may be already known to CI officials.
The SVR like its predecessor organizations has demonstrated a penchant for the use of Illegals. They have dispatched such agents throughout the globe since the fall of the Soviet union.
These folks were not inept. They just got bested by good CI work (or luck). I would not be surprised if they were identified by one of our own assets. Of course from the criminal complaints, it looks like some poor tradecraft contributed.
——————————The “quaint” tradecraft is lethal, of course, as it always has been, because it works! Of course the addition of steganography and the wifi data transfers make it more contemporary. Low tech and high tech. Social networking…sure. Perfect.
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I think an Intelligence Services’ greatness is measured by its ability to recruit through long-term inducement operations and their ability to run long-term illegal operations. The SVR is a great service, but I would say today that the FBI is greater yet to have uncovered and then neutralized their illegal network in the US.
——————————My take on all this is that the present Administration, in full formal diplomatic attire, is happy to not make waves while our media is soaking up the only information available to them, from Russia With Love.
What I see in this is exactly what Russia has been doing for decades. They target the upper policy levels of our Government, which also is the easiest target to penetrate, but which gives them spotting information which will then lead them to the real targets for penetrations and more detailed information.
For example, the policy makers also know what other programs and projects are underway in the Government and our R&D labs, that will be of interest to the Russians. The Russians can then send spies to target these other, more specific targets such as weapons, defense, technology, etc. etc. This is exactly what they have been doing for decades.
Earlier, they penetrated every Washington policy organizations at the very top, and successfully. Recall they had two spies in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s White House, at least one in the OSS, several in the State Depts, Judy Coplan in Justice, and the list goes on and on. This is the way to conduct classical espionage.
The FBI did a good job, but may have lost the opportunity to hold off and catch them in the act of later on, only at which time our public would understand espionage. They may have also lost the opportunity for later deception to plant false information through these agents to Russia.
The only good news out of this is that the Russians now know that we know what they were up to. Where is Obama’s clever words and speeches to counter or comment on this? Instead, we have bought into Medvedev’s push to reset his button to get the U.S. to help him get into the high tech business, create a Silicon Valley in Russian, etc. etc. And the usual greedy, but naive American high tech corporations are ready to rush in to help the Russians compete with us technically, as we set up the Chinese to do.
——————————The uneducated folks –- especially in the news media — who have cited the “dated and Cold War era tradecraft” in the derogatory have actually missed the point. It is not Cold War tradecraft. It is generally about 2,000-5,000 years old and it is that old because it is like the Energizer Bunny… It keeps on working and working and working and……
Smart counterintelligence officers and counter-terrorist hunters have a common understanding of what works.
Follow the money. The operations spending of the “handlers” on the espionage, given into the hands of the street spies or terrorists, does not arrive by some miraculous form of email or space robot. In the final analysis spendable money must go from hand to hand. So the spendable form of money is both the fuel AND the nemesis of the spies or terrorists.
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Almost no person I have seen interviewed has ever pursued this target and clearly they do not understand the very unique Illegals issue. The talking heads all miss what is so important about what occurred yesterday.
I have spent a huge chunk of my professional life studying and working this target. While I cannot make the specific comments I would like to make in this medium for all the obvious reasons, let me just say that what I have read so far reflects a “game changer” for Directorate “S”. Oleg Kalugin was quoted as saying he was astonished at what happened as the occupations and the high profile of the Illegals go against the historical grain. He is so right: extraordinary operational departure from the storied past.
I was amazed that such a resource intense, finished operational product was involved in some of the ops related activities as has been mentioned in the official documents and the news reports. High risk, low profit ventures. Just crazy. The risk does not appear to begin to justify the objectives as to why these highly trained professionals were sent to the US. Run a high level penetration like Bloch? Of course – that is one of their historical missions. Clear drop sites outside of the 25 mile zone? Yes. Vet a probable asset using commercial or academic cover? Of course. But influence operations? High profile life styles and flamboyance? Makes no sense whatsoever.
No talking head to the best of my knowledge has linked this case to the Red Wasp Network which presents an interesting parallel. Few have distinguished the differences between a “cadre officer Illegal” and a “special agent Illegal” yet both are employed in the net. They are entirely different categories within the Illegals sub strata.
Can you imagine the head of the SVR being called to the Kremlin to explain this disaster to Putin? Is the outcome going to be the death knell for Directorate “S”? How would you like to sign up for the Damage Assessment team. Years worth of employment await.
The Director General of MI5 at least put this into some long needed perspective reminding all of the critical importance of counterintelligence as we seem to be turning all of our efforts solely to the CT effort. A welcome reminder and a most important one.
Congratulations to the FBI and any other yet unnamed organization(s) who pulled this off. Huge success by any measure.
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While most people, East and West, often consider that Cold War ended and communism was defeated back in 1991 or so, I believe nothing could be farther from the truth.
Russian demographics may be in a death spiral with nothing much to look forward to in coming decades except inexorable Slavic ethnic decline, but in the meantime since 1991, SVR is merely KGB in new packaging. Communism the economic system may have been discredited everyplace except Pennsylvania Ave. and the halls of American academia, but hostility to U.S. and West in general remains unabated.
Today’s occupants of the Kremlin are exactly the same as, or proteges of, the old KGB crowd — and hold the same animosity, jealousy, and unmitigated motivation to penetrate, influence, degrade, and destroy U.S. government and society. Resources/abilities may or may not be slipping–remains to be seen what is the “rest of the story” behind this affair…..certain we/media do not have a fraction of it yet.
This gang may or may not have been amateurs or in the midst of their OJT….but point is that Kremlin not only still thought it worthwhile, but also feasible, to fund, train, insert, grow, direct them in a long-term pursuit of precisely same objectives as those pursued by Lenin, Stalin, Krushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and yes, even Gorbachev.
Putin actually is one of most lethally capable KGB adversaries this country has ever faced–reset button or not. And as a relatively young, powerful, and utterly ruthless capo of the historical mold, he is nowhere near done yet….likely to see him back in top slot in near future. In actuality, he’s never relinquished either control or hostility. We Americans just tend to breed leadership too naive to realize it.
We can hope that FBI is actually on top of things – no way of knowing merely from these arrests. What is definitely lacking across IC, however, is institutional memory of what the Cold War was/is all about. Younger generations of Americans, even those drawn to, accepted into, government service/Intel Community, have very difficult time conceiving of human beings who hate us so much they will work their entire careers/lives to destroy us. Basic appreciation of evil (not to mention classical clandestine tradecraft) is simply missing from their thinking in too many cases. We see this endlessly among students. This is enormous handicap in dealing with this and other 21st century enemies.
But my key point would be to emphasize that Cold War, KGB enemy never did end or go gently into that good night. Rather, they reorganized, reconstituted even as old USSR geographically was falling apart. KGB remains in control of Kremlin and active across the world with purpose of destroying Western civ…..which is why the decades-old cooperative operational relationship btwn KGB/Russian OC and Islamic Jihadi enemy remains so solid.
Expect this episode is merely tip of an iceberg of whose true dimensions we can only hope our national security leadership is aware.
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Perhaps this group was building legends that were to be used elsewhere. The US media suffers from the same time warp constraints that affect US foreign policy and military operations. Everything must be now. You have to be able to show results within your time of stewardship. They have no concept of patience or long term operations.
For example personnel with established US legends would be excellent candidates for inserting into foreign environments with their “little America” establishments that are rife with gossip and access to senior US diplomats and military personnel. So instead of using a friendly foreign national you use a certified “real” US citizen who blends easily into the group. If they have an actual job and receive living expenses from their employers so much the better. I can think of at least ten good scenarios where a solid US legend would form the base for a good spy op overseas.
We should also consider the use of intelligence officers not as collectors but as those who provide wherewithal to agents of influence. I’ll defer to our FBI colleagues to comment upon Soviet attempts during the Seventies to provide financial assistance to anti-establishment groups but they were real and effective. Could this have been an operation to cultivate agents of influence or to establish a support network to handle such agents?
While the media might initially think of this as a good story line they would quickly shy away from it because it strikes too close to home when you consider the previous Soviet efforts at using journalists as agents of influence.
This could be another case of our imposing our thought processes upon an adversary who thinks differently (we do it all the time.) Have we forgotten the KGB’s predilection for active measures? True espionage is so much more than stealing secrets. In a world where twenty second sound bites constitute news and “experts” are resident on internet blogs you can move a lot of mis/disinformation that can impact not just national but state and local perceptions of issues.
Then again this could simply be an inept group unable to penetrate their target because of a variety of societal conventions and security practices. Still when you consider what Putin did in Dresden(available from Washington Post online) this becomes a logical extension. That the Russian government immediately asked for access to these “illegals” is intriguing.
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From former British MI5 chief Dame Stella Rimington as quoted in The Guardian:
. . . . . Ex-intelligence personnel, however, feel rather differently. “I don’t find it terribly surprising,” says Dame Stella Rimington, who in 1992 became the first female director general of MI5. “I think espionage is for ever.”
Rimington cautions against jumping to conclusions about the outdatedness of their methods.
“The use of illegals is a technique that we associate with the cold war – but it’s a very effective way of getting agents into a country. You document them with a completely false identity” – though it is unusual to make them nationals of the country they’re spying on, as these ones were, rather than of a third country – “and the idea is that they will establish themselves long-term and get close to whatever their target is.”
“I don’t think it’s quite as naive as you think. There are all kinds of uses to which you can put people embedded in a country. They had professions, these people. One of the guys was apparently a futurologist – he was trained to foresee risk. That’s an ideal way of getting alongside people who might be of interest – to talent-spot people who might be susceptible to an approach. It’s naive to assume that because they appeared to be picking up things that were freely available, that was all they were doing.”
The fact remains that “old-fashioned techniques are often quite effective,” Rimington says.
“Don’t forget they were effective in the cold war, when the security was more intense than they would have found it now. There’s no replacement for human sources. The technology might have become more sophisticated, but the best intelligence still comes from human beings.”. . . .
. . . . The Russians, in particular, says Rimington, “have always put a great deal of faith in information that they learn covertly. They see direct information and covert information as complementary. It’s a way to look at things in the round, as it were. And in a country such as Russia, with a large bureaucracy and lots of people, they can perhaps spend more time on this kind of thing than you would here.”
Or, as Oleg Gordievsky, KGB bureau chief in London until he defected to Britain in 1985, puts it: “Cold war is the normal state of the world.”. . . .
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“They weren’t posing as hermits or cloistered monks, were they? These illegals held jobs that supplied a wealth of innocuous reasons to blend in, move about, travel abroad, facilitate personal interactions, and meet interesting, diverse and well placed people — all essential to espionage operations.”
– Michelle Van Cleave, a former chief of the National Counterintelligence Executive, in the Washington Post
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Christian Science Monitor, 1 July 2010:
“As long as there are secrets that people want to know, there will be spies,” says Peter Earnest, executive director of the International Spy Museum in Washington. ”It’s basic human nature to be interested in what is being kept from you, especially by your own or other governments.”
The former CIA case officer, who spent 35 years on the job, says the single most important element in any relationship, whether between a handler and his network of agents, a husband and wife, or governments, is trust. “And of course, as Reagan made famous in his motto for dealing with the former Soviet Union during his arms talks, you trust but verify.”
The Russians are well known for their commitment to the latter, he says with a laugh. As far back as Catherine the Great they have been sending agents to collect information on the rest of the world. “When the Second World War broke out, the Soviets had some 250 recruited agents in place all over the US, everywhere from Hollywood to Roosevelt’s office,” he points out. “On the other hand, our government had a big fat goose egg for agents inside their country because they were our allies. We trusted them.” . . . .
. . . . But in reality, “there is more espionage in peace time than in war time,” says Joe Navarro, adjunct professor of criminal justice at Saint Leo University in Florida. A 25-year veteran of the FBI’s National Security Division, Mr. Navarro says the Russians are singular in their devotion to intelligence-gathering – they hang on to traditional espionage methods should hostilities ever break out. “They believe in having a system that is robust and is not endangered of being hurt should the Internet or phone system be down,” he says in an email.
These contacts and drops used by the Russians are fail-safe, he says. “One would have to be looking for every piece of bubble gum attached to a phone pole to determine if it was a drop signal.”
He points out that many different people conduct services for the Russians – spotters and assessors, who are used to recruit, and facilitators, “which a lot of these guys seem to be, and you have the people that we haven’t even talked about that would be in place to combat sabotage.” . . .
Washington Jewish Week, 3 June 2010: Those who know Shamai Leibowitz of Silver Spring, Md. describe him as a doting father, enchanting Torah reader and, above all, a trusted member of the community. But a recently revealed other side to Leibowitz’s life has some reacting with disbelief and shock.
Last week, Leibowitz, 39, the Shabbat Torah reader at Har Tzeon-Agudath Achim, a Conservative synagogue in Silver Spring, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for leaking classified government documents to a blogger last year while serving as a linguist for the FBI. . . . .
Washington Post, 25 May 2010: A Silver Spring man who worked as a linguist for the FBI was sentenced Monday to 20 months in prison for leaking secret documents to a blogger. But federal prosecutors in Maryland have remained mum about exactly what was contained in the classified papers that Shamai K. Leibowitz, 39, gave the unnamed blogger in April 2009, while he worked on contract for the FBI. According to court records, the documents concerned “communication intelligence activities.”
During a Monday hearing in U.S. District Court in Greenbelt, Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven M. Dunne said Leibowitz “betrayed the FBI when he worked there,” but offered no details. U.S. District Judge Alexander Williams Jr. said the response of federal authorities convinced him Leibowitz committed a “very, very serious offense.” But the judge said even he does not know what information Leibowitz, a Hebrew scholar, disclosed. “I don’t know what was divulged, other than some documents, and I don’t know how it’s compromised things,” Williams said in court.
Leibowitz, who worked as a lawyer in Israel and has dual U.S. and Israeli citizenship, said in court papers that he worked for the U.S. State Department in 2006, teaching Hebrew and Israeli law and culture to American diplomats. He said he then was hired as a contractor by the U.S. Department of Defense at its Defense Language Institute. According to court papers, Leibowitz worked on contract for the FBI from January through August 2009.
In court Monday, Leibowitz said he made a mistake. But he said that, at the time he revealed the classified information, he believed the documents showed a “violation of the law.” He said he should have pursued other options within the government to report his concerns. . . .
Former FBI Contract Linguist Sentenced for Leaking Classified Information to Blogger (FBI, 24 May 2010)
U.S. District Judge Alexander Williams sentenced former FBI contract linguist, Shamai Kedem Leibowitz, aka Samuel Shamai Leibowitz, age 40, of Silver Spring, Md., today to 20 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release for unlawfully providing classified documents to the host of an Internet blog who then published information from those documents on the blog.
The sentence was announced by David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Rod J. Rosenstein, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland; and Richard A. McFeely, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Baltimore Field Office.
“The willful disclosure of classified information to those not entitled to receive it is a serious crime,” said David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security. “Today’s sentence should serve as a warning to anyone in government who would consider compromising our nation’s secrets.”
“Government employees who are given access to classified information are prohibited from disclosing the information without permission,” said U.S. Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein.
“As a trusted member of the FBI ranks, Leibowitz abused the trust of the FBI and the American public by using his access to classified information for his own purposes,” said Special Agent in Charge Richard A. McFeely.
According to Liebowitz’s plea agreement, from January through August 2009, Leibowitz was employed by the FBI as a contract linguist in an office in Calverton, Md. Leibowitz held a Top Secret security clearance and had lawful access to classified documents and information relating to the communication intelligence activities of the United States. In April 2009, Leibowitz caused five documents classified as Secret, which contained classified information relating to the communication intelligence activities of the United States, to be furnished to a person not entitled to receive such information.
The recipient was the host of a public blog available to anyone with access to the Internet. The recipient then published on the blog information from the classified documents.
U.S. Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein thanked Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven M. Dunne, of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland, and Trial Attorney Kathleen M. Kedian, of the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, who prosecuted the case.
New York Times, 17 May 2010: Third time’s the charm? President Obama on Monday made his third try to fill the vacant chair atop one of the government’s primary security agencies, this time picking someone who may have an easier time passing the F.B.I. background check – the deputy director of the F.B.I.
The president announced that he will nominate John S. Pistole, the number two official at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to take over the Transportation Security Administration, which oversees airport passenger screening. With Mr. Obama’s first two choices withdrawing after revelations of past behavior, the T.S.A. has been without an Obama appointee heading it for 16 months since he took office.
“The talent and knowledge John has acquired in more than two decades of service with the F.B.I. will make him a valuable asset to our administration’s efforts to strengthen the security and screening measures at our airports,” Mr. Obama said in a statement announcing Mr. Pistole’s nomination. . . .
