DNI Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 Feb 10: . . . I am pleased to be accompanied today by the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.

The strategic landscape has changed considerably for US interests over the past year. We see some improvements, but also several entrenched problems and slow progress in some areas for the foreseeable future. Several large-scale threats to fundamental US interests will require increased attention, and it is on one of these threats that I will focus our initial discussion. . . .

• Far-Reaching Impact of the Cyber Threat
• The Changing Threat to the Global Economy
• Terrorists Under Pressure; Terrorist Threat to Homeland Remains
  • . . . . We face a persistent terrorist threat from al-Qa’ida and potentially others who share its anti-Western ideology. A major terrorist attack may emanate from either outside or inside the United States. Enhanced offensive and defensive counterterrorism efforts have certainly interrupted or deterred some plotting against the Homeland, but actionable intelligence on the key details of terrorist plots—dates, specific targets, and the identity of operatives—are often fragmentary and inconclusive thanks to the terrorists’ stringent operational security practices.
  • We judge that al-Qa’ida maintains its intent to attack the Homeland—preferably with a largescale operation that would cause mass casualties, harm the US economy, or both. In April 2009, Abu Yahya al-Libi, the official spokesperson and head of al-Qa’ida’s religious committee, publicly advocated blowing up US military, political, economic, and financial institutions. While he did not specifically address attacking the Homeland, in a videotaped message in June 2009 Usama Bin Ladin warned the American people to be prepared to continue reaping what the White House sowed. In the same month al-Qa’ida’s third-incommand, Shaykh Sa’id al-Masri, said that the organization’s strategy for the future is similar to its strategy in the past—namely “hitting Americans.”
  • In our judgment, al-Qa’ida also retains the capability to recruit, train, and deploy operatives to mount some kind of an attack against the Homeland. . . . . Targets that have been the focus of more than one al-Qa’ida plot include aviation, financial institutions in New York City, and government targets in Washington, D.C. Other targets al-Qa’ida has considered include the Metro system in Washington D.C., bridges, gas infrastructure, reservoirs, residential complexes, and public venues for large gatherings. . . . . We judge that, if al-Qa’ida develops chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and has operatives trained to use them, it will do so.
• The Growing Proliferation Threat
• Afghanistan
• Pakistan: Turning Against Domestic Extremists
• India
• Mixed Outlook Middle East
• China’s Continuing Transformation
• Outlook for Russia
• Latin America Stable, but Challenged by Crime and Populism
• Continued Instability in Africa
• Potential Flashpoints in Eurasia and Balkans
• Regional Impacts of Climate Change
• Strategic Health Challenges and Threats
• Significant State and Non-State Intelligence Threats
  • During the past year, China’s intelligence services continue to expand and operate in and outside the United States. Its human collection services enhanced their collection and processing capabilities directed against the United States.

  ♦ CI CENTRE COURSE: 207–PRC Intelligence Services: Operations and Methodologies

  • Russia continues to strengthen its intelligence capabilities and directs them against US interests worldwide. Moscow’s intelligence effort includes espionage, technology acquisition, and covert action efforts to alter events abroad without showing its hand.

  ♦ CI CENTRE COURSE: 191–Russia Intelligence Services: Operations & Methodologies

  • Iran is enhancing its focus on US intelligence activities and relies on foreign intelligence partnerships to extend its capabilities. Iran continues to pursue intelligence outreach efforts to reduce the country’s isolation and counter US interests.

  ♦ CI CENTRE COURSE: 270–Iranian Intelligence Services: Operations & Methodologies

  • Cuban intelligence collects against US activities for insight into our operations and intentions globally. Cuba maintains intelligence liaison relationships with a number of US adversaries and competitors.

  ♦ CI CENTRE COURSE: 159–Cuban Intelligence Services: Operations & Methodologies

  • North Korea and Venezuela possess more limited intelligence capabilities focused primarily on regional threats and supporting the ruling regime. North Korea continues to collect information on US technologies and capabilities. Venezuela’s services are working to counter US influence in Latin America by supporting leftist governments and insurgent groups.

  ♦ CI CENTRE COURSE: 158–Venezuela: An Introduction to Myriad National Security Threats to America

  • Several transnational terrorist groups have demonstrated the capability to conduct intelligence activities to support their operational and political activities. Al-Qa’ida possesses effective but uneven intelligence capabilities. Lebanese Hizballah exhibits effective intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities and activities.

  ♦ CI CENTRE COURSE: 267–An Introduction to Hezbollah: A Top Terrorist Organization

  ♦ CI CENTRE COURSE: 361–The Global Jihadist Threat Doctrine

  • International organized crime networks—including drug traffickers—continue to improve their intelligence capabilities and pose a growing threat to the United States.
• Growing Threat from International Organized Crime

BBC, 2 Feb 10: For six years from 1955 Britain ran a secretive programme to school young men in Chinese before shipping them off to the Far East to spy. Only now has their story become public. . .

. . . . The story starts at a time when the world was split between capitalism and communism. The rise to power of Chairman Mao in China put the British territory of Hong Kong in a highly vulnerable, yet also suddenly strategic position. The British government decided it needed a reliable group of men, based there, who could listen in to the radio broadcasts emanating from the closed off People’s Republic, next door. The problem was, how many Brits could actually speak Chinese?

Rupert Allason, who writes about intelligence history under the name Nigel West, says the decision was taken to train people and National Service, which every fit man of 18 and over had to do, “represented a gigantic virtually free resource…these were young men who had a commitment, whether they liked it or not, for two years”. . . . .