http://cicentre.com/training/361.html
361: The Global Jihadist Threat Doctrine is CI Centre’s flagship counterterrorism course first run in January 2007. It is designed specifically for the national security community–intelligence, military, homeland security, law enforcement to understand the Jihadist threat doctrine.
In all wars and conflicts, the doctrines of the enemy are studied in order to defeat them.During the Cold War, the Soviet Threat Doctrine was extensively studied by all levels of Western intelligence professionals, the military services and policymakers. They read the writings of Communist founders and leaders such as Marx and Lenin. They studied Soviet statements and sources. They knew Soviet history, ideology and goals. They understood the threat.
Now, a new threat doctrine, the Global Jihadist Threat Doctrine, demands our attention. We must study and know this doctrine as much as we studied and knew the Soviet Doctrine.
The Global Jihadist Threat Doctrine course covers what Jihadists believe, who they are learning their beliefs from, the roots of their beliefs, their worldview and why their ideology has such a strong, motivating hold on them.
A detailed background of the radicalization process and its warning signs are discussed in-depth, including a first-hand look at a Jihadist’s actual path towards extremism. The motivations, mindsets and metholodogies of suicide bombers is included in the course. The concepts of taqiyya and deception are covered including cases of infiltration by Jihadists in the government and law enforcement and what this means to investigators.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s covert influence operations against the West including front groups and agents of influence; the importance of key events in 1979 and its impact on today; and present/future Jihadist strategies and tactics in the United States and around the world are all included in this important course.
Attendees will gain a solid understanding of key concepts of Islamic doctrine, texts, leaders, goals, history, ideology and definitions of terms.
The centrality of Islamic Sharia Law as the main guide to Jihadists is covered in-depth, including what the law says and how it differs from the US Constitution. The concept of Professional Responsibility is discussed along with this topic to emphasize the need for professionals to have a deep, comprehensive and realistic understanding of the modern-day Jihadist movement (mindset and motivation) in order to successfully conduct their job, analyze information, handle assets, plan strategy or formulate policy.
This is a very powerful, eye-opening course taught by the nation’s leading experts in this topic. See the effect the course has on attendees by reading a sample of their feedback. Over and over again, people who’ve taken this course ask why they didn’t know this information earlier and now that they do, it will completely change the way they do their job.
No other course is more important and needed in this age of ever-present, continuing threats by Jihadists to the safety of citizens both here in our homeland and overseas.
Lives are at stake.
YOU NEED TO KNOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS COURSE
Contact the CI Centre at 703-642-7450 or 1-800-779-4007 for information on how to schedule this course for your organization.
Wall Street Journal/Reuel Marc Gerecht, 8 Jan 10: The recent death in Afghanistan of seven American counterterrorist officers, one Jordanian intelligence operative, and one exploding al Qaeda double agent ought to give us cause to reflect on the real capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and al Qaeda. . . . Professionally, one has to admire the skill of suicide bomber Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi’s handlers. This operation could well have been months—if not longer—in the making, and neither the Jordanian intelligence service (GID), which supplied the double agent to the CIA, nor Langley apparently had any serious suspicion that al-Balawi still had the soul and will of a jihadist.
That is an impressive feat. The Hashemite monarchy imprisons lots of Islamic militants, and the GID has the responsibility to interrogate them. The dead Jordanian official, Sharif Ali bin Zeid, reportedly a member of the royal family, may not have been a down-and-dirty case officer with considerable hands-on contact with militants, but al-Balawi surely passed through some kind of intensive screening process with the GID. Yet the GID and the CIA got played, and al Qaeda has revealed that it is capable of running sophisticated clandestine operations with sustained deception.
Indeed, al Qaeda did to us exactly what we intended to do to them: use a mole for a lethal strike against high-value targets. In the case of al-Balawi, it appears the target was Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama bin Ladin’s top deputy. During the Cold War, the CIA completely dropped its guard in the pursuit of much-desired Cuban and East German agents. The result? Most of our assets were plants given to us by Cuban and East German intelligence. With al-Balawi supposedly providing “good” information about al Zawahiri and al Qaeda’s terrorist planning, a salivating CIA and the GID proved inattentive to counterintelligence concerns. . . . .
Newsweek, 9 Jan 10: At the CIA training facility in Virginia known as “The Farm,” one of the standard courses is called “High Threat Meetings.” All aspiring case officers spend the three-week class learning how to arrange a get-together with potentially dangerous informants. When meeting with such agents, “security is everything,” recalls one graduate. “I remember being told very forcefully, ‘It doesn’t matter what you might get from an informant if you wind up dead.’ ” There are very rigorous protocols for such meetings, says another former agent who once taught the course: all informants should be searched carefully, the rendezvous location should be staked out ahead of time, and when the mole arrives, only one or two CIA officers should be present. “The protocol is for a case officer to meet an informant one-on-one, or maybe two—always, always, always,” adds Robert Baer, a former CIA officer who spent years tracking terrorists in the Mideast. “The one thing you never do is meet an informant with a committee.” . . . .
. . . . The Balawi case raises a further question: how good is Al Qaeda at infiltrating our national-security agencies? That’s been a fear in intelligence circles at least since 2003, when two Arabic translators working at Guantánamo were arrested on suspicion of terrorist sympathies. (One linguist pleaded guilty to minor charges of insubordination and mishandling secret information; charges against the other were all dropped.) The following year the CIA convened a special two-day conference to discuss the counterintelligence threat posed by Al Qaeda and other terror groups. The meeting took place at the headquarters of a European spy agency, and included representatives from 10 allied countries. At the time, the very notion that Al Qaeda could be clever enough to plant a mole in a Western spy organization “was a new concept to everybody,” says a former security official who helped organize the event. But the meeting ended without an action plan. “. . . . .
AP, 9 Jan 10: The Jordanian doctor who killed seven CIA employees in a suicide attack in Afghanistan said in a video broadcast posthumously Saturday that all jihadists must attack U.S. targets to avenge the death of Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.
The video showed Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi – whom the CIA had cultivated as an asset against al-Qaida – sitting with Mehsud’s successor in an undisclosed location. It essentially confirmed the Pakistani Taliban’s claim of responsibility for one of the worst attacks in CIA history, though analysts said al-Qaida and Afghan militants likely played roles, too. Speaking in Arabic in the video shown on al-Jazeera, the Arabic network, and Aaj, a Pakistani channel, al-Balawi noted that the Pakistani Taliban had given shelter to “emigrants” – Muslim fighters from abroad. Mehsud, the group’s longtime leader, was killed in August by a CIA missile strike.
“We will never forget the blood of our emir Baitullah Mehsud,” said al-Balawi, who wore Afghan dress on the 1 1/2 minute video. “We will always demand revenge for him inside America and outside. It is an obligation of the emigrants who were welcomed by the emir.”
The 32-year-old al-Balawi was apparently a double agent – perhaps even a triple-agent – with links to al-Qaida, the CIA and Jordanian intelligence. He was invited inside the CIA facility in Afghanistan’s eastern Khost province bearing a promise of information about Ayman al-Zawahri, al-Qaida’s second-in-command. Instead, he blew himself up in a Dec. 30 meeting, killing seven including the CIA’s base chief.
In the video, al-Balawi appeared to mock assertions that U.S. or Jordanian intelligence had employed him. “The emigrant for the sake of God will not put his religion on the bargaining table and will not sell his religion even if they put the sun in his right hand and the moon in his left,” he said, a reference to a verse in the Quran.”. . . . . .
Bomber Who Killed C.I.A. Officers Appears in Video
New York Times, 9 Jan 10: . . . . Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, wearing green camouflage fatigues and carrying a weapon in his lap, appeared in a video on Al Jazeera satellite television denouncing his “enemies,” Jordan and America. Mr. Balawi’s father, Khaled, confirmed that the man in the video was his son.
“This is a letter to the enemies of the nation,” the heavily-bearded Mr. Balawi said, referring to the Islamic nation, or ummah. “To the Jordanian intelligence and the American Central Intelligence Agency.” He sat alongside another man in front of a black banner bearing the Islamic credo: “There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet.”
. . . . The Pakistani television channel Aaj also broadcast a video, and identified the second man seen in it as Hakimullah Mehsud, the new leader of the Taliban in Pakistan.. . . .
CI CENTRE COURSE – 361: The Global Jihadist Threat Doctrine
Washington Post, 9 Jan 10: The Jordanian doctor arrived in a red station wagon that came directly from Pakistan and sped through checkpoints at a CIA base in Afghanistan before stopping abruptly at an improvised interrogation center. Outside stood one of the CIA’s top experts on al-Qaeda, ready to greet the doctor and hear him describe a way to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, the organization’s number two and a man long at the top of U.S. target lists.
The Jordanian exited the car with one hand in his pocket, according to the accounts of several U.S. officials briefed on the incident. An American security guard approached him to conduct a pat-down search and asked him to remove his hand. Instead, the Jordanian triggered a switch. A sharp “CLMMMP” coincided with a brief flash and a small puff of smoke as thousands of steel pellets shredded glass, metal, cement and flesh in every direction.
A moment that CIA officials in Washington and Afghanistan had hoped would lead to a significant breakthrough in the fight against al-Qaeda instead became the most grievous single blow against the agency in the counter-terror war.
Virtually everyone within sight of the suicide bomb died immediately, including the CIA al-Qaeda expert; a 30-year old CIA analyst; an interpreter and two other CIA officers; the two contract guards; the Jordanian’s handler and the car’s driver. At least six others standing in the carport and nearby were wounded by pellets that had first perforated the vehicle, including the CIA’s second-in-command inside Afghanistan, who is now reportedly fighting for his life. . . . .
. . . Several intelligence sources said the principal mistake was in trusting the bona fides of the Jordanian doctor, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, who had never previously been invited to the base. The meeting was arranged with help from an allied intelligence officer from Jordan, who was among those waiting at the site for Balawi to arrive and was himself killed by the pellets.
. . . . “The tradecraft that was developed over many years is passe,” complained a recently retired senior intelligence official, also with decades of experience. “Now it’s a military tempo where you don’t have time for validating and vetting sources. All that seems to have gone by the board. It shows there are not a lot of people with a great deal of experience in this field. The agency people are supporting the war-fighter and providing information for targeting, but the espionage part has become almost quaint.” . . . .
. . . . After a Jordanian authorities incarcerated him briefly in January 2009 because of his extremist Web postings, Balawi had traveled to Pakistan in March, ostensibly for medical studies. He subsequently sent tantalizing information by e-mail to Jordanian intelligence officials, who shared them with the Americans. The messages included descriptions of the results of U.S. missile attacks on al-Qaeda and Taliban training camps and safe houses, including details about victims and facilities that no one knew outside a small circle of intelligence analysts and the terrorists themselves. Senior CIA officials in Washington who were receiving updates on the man’s reports were impressed by “irrefutable proof” that he had been in the presence of al-Qaeda’s top leaders, one of the officials said. The proof included “photograph-type evidence,” the official said. . . .
