By Dr. Tawfik Hamid
Dr. Hamid is a Muslim reformer, CI Centre instructor and author of “Inside Jihad”
The rising cases of home-grown Islamist Radicalism in the US and the several terror plots that were discovered in 2009 in the US are alarming. The five Muslim students who went to Pakistan to wage Jihad against their own country, the Fort Hood Massacre, and the latest Christmas airline terror attempt are just a few examples of many. In fact, statistically speaking, the number of home-grown Islamist terror plots inside the US was the highest since 2001. In trying to understand this trend in the first year of the current Administration, one should question whether some actions of the President are perceived in a way that is encouraging the Jihadists to intensify their attacks on the US. While there could be several explanations for this sharp rise of terrorism cases in the US after President Obama took office, the possibility of adverse reactions to some of his actions should not be discounted.
Firstly, from a cultural perspective, the Arab world resonates with appearances of strength and weakness. This could be related to the admiration of the role played by wars and the military defeat of non-Muslims in the early expansion of Islam or it could be also be related to the classical Islamic notion of God that is based on ‘fear’ from his power. Other factors such as ancient Arabic poems that glorified tribal warfare played a role in creating this mentality that respects power.
Irrespective of the cause of this psychological makeup, it is vital to mention that actions taken by the US in its outreach efforts to the Muslim world MUST be evaluated carefully so that they are not perceived by the Jihadists as signs of weakness. A delicate balance is needed so that the US can win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims without being perceived as a weak country as this perception can actually aggravate the problem of Jihadism. Such notions are indeed, foreign to a Western mentality, but it is crucial to be able to understand these cultural “translation” issues.
Some of the actions of President Obama that could have been perceived as weakness by the Jihadists include:
1) Excessive bowing to the King of Saudi Arabia instead of giving him the normal Saudi greetings or hug. Bowing is seen by many Muslims as a sign of extreme weakness and an act of worship that should be given only to God. President Obama could have given the king a traditional Saudi hug without doing an act of worship as the latter would only make the President perceived as weak in the eyes of the radicals.
2) Giving the closure of Guantanamo Bay a priority on the President’s agenda was another action that could have been perceived as a sign of weakness by many radicals. Many believed that the existence of the Guantanamo Bay prison was used as a recruitment tool for Al-Qaeda. However, statistics are showing that the number of terror attempts and attacks on the US have actually increased after active steps were taken to close the prison when President Obama took office in 2009.
3) Raising the issue of possible punishment for CIA officials for using tough measures against the terrorists could be perceived by the Radicals as another sign of US weakness. This issue should have been dealt with in a very secretive manner within the government to avoid giving the Jihadists a feeling of victory that might encourage them to do more attacks on the US – as well as revealing sensitive information regarding our intelligence gathering methods.
4) Defending the rights of Muslim women to wear the Hijab without showing the same level of care to defending the rights of Muslim women who want to practice their freedom to be ‘westernized’ or to choose their faith has sent another message of weakness that could aggravate Islamic radicalism. The president praised Nashala Hearn (a Muslim) from Muskogee, Oklahoma for standing for her right to wear the Hijab and invited her to be a guest in Ramadan dinner (Iftar) at the White House in September 2009.
On the other hand, the President did not show the same level of care by showing a clear stand beside Muslim women who want to practice their freedom in the US. One of the recent Muslim victims for freedom was Noor Faleh Almaleki: a 20-year-old woman from Iraq who was killed in the US by her father who ran her over with a car because she had become “too westernized”. Furthermore, President Obama neither praised nor invited Rifqua Bary (a Muslim) — who could be killed for apostasy inside the US according to Islamic Sharia rules — to show a similar stand with her rights to choose her beliefs. Showing such care to young Muslim women who want to wear the Hijab and failure to show the same level of care to Muslim women who want to be ‘westernized’ or who want to practice freedom of religion in the US was another action that can only be perceived as weakness by the Jihadists that invites more aggression against the US.
The above factors may not be perceived as weakness in Western minds; however, what is more important is how they are perceived in the Jihadists’ and Radical’s minds. Presidential actions can not be interpreted as weakness, because if so, this will actually aggravate Islamic Radicalism. A careful balance and consideration of cultural notions is needed in US diplomacy to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of Muslims without being perceived as weak. US actions need to be developed and carried out through the lens of the target audience – not from a Western perspective – in order to create a positive impact on the Muslim world.
New York Times, 31 Dec 09: The apparent ties between the Nigerian man charged with plotting to blow up an airliner on Christmas Day and a radical American-born Yemeni imam have cast a spotlight on a world of charismatic clerics who wield their Internet celebrity to indoctrinate young Muslims with extremist ideology and recruit them for Al Qaeda, American officials and counterterrorism specialists said.
American military and law enforcement authorities said Thursday that the man accused in the bombing attempt, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, most likely had contacts with the cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, whom investigators have also named as having exchanged e-mail messages with Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, an American Army psychiatrist charged with killing 13 people in a shooting rampage in November at Fort Hood, Tex.
Speaking in eloquent, often colloquial, English, Mr. Awlaki and other Internet imams from the Middle East to Britain offer a televangelist’s persuasive message of faith, purpose and a way forward, for both the young and as yet uncommitted, as well as for the most devout worshipers ready to take the next step, to jihad, officials say.
“People across the spectrum of radicalism can gravitate to them, if they’re just dipping their toe in or they’re hard core,” said Jarret Brachman, author of “Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice” (Routledge, 2008) and a consultant to the United States government about terrorism. “The most important thing they do is take very complex ideological thoughts and make them simple, with clear guidelines on how to follow Islamic law.”
In an online posting in 2005 under the name “farouk1986,” Mr. Abdulmutallab referred to another radical Muslim cleric he listened to, a Jamaican-born preacher named Abdullah el-Faisal. Mr. Faisal, who was deported from Britain in 2007, was convicted four years earlier for soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred in English- and Arabic-language tapes of speeches urging his followers to kill Hindus, Christians, Jews and Americans. He was later accused of influencing one of the attackers in the London bombings of July 2005.
These celebrity imams — in addition to their knowledge of the Koran and Islamic theology — offer in some cases an almost heroic flair because of their occasional brushes with the law. Among the examples are Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan cleric, who escaped from prison in Afghanistan in 2005, and Mr. Faisal, who continued to preach online even after his arrest and deportation.
. . . . . American and European authorities say some of these clerics, like Mr. Awlaki, offer something much more sinister than just guideposts to radical Islam: a pipeline to Al Qaeda operatives in places like Yemen and the lawless Pakistan tribal areas.
“Awlaki is, among other things, a talent spotter,” an American counterterrorism official said. “That’s part of his value to Al Qaeda. If people are drawn to him, he can pass them along to trainers and operational planners. Abdulmutallab was cannon fodder, a piece snapped into an operation.”
Sheikh Khalid bin Abdul Rahman al-Husainan of Kuwait, who is fast attracting a large following, mixes contemporary politics with talk of martyrdom.
“Obama, in the same way that you raised the slogan, ‘Yes We Can,’ I too have a slogan,” Mr. Husainan wrote in August 2009. “My slogan in this life — and memorize this slogan — is ‘Happiness is the day of my martyrdom.’ ”
appeared in print on January 1, 2010, on page A14 of the New York edition. .
Psychology Today/Joe Navarro:
Joe Navarro is a former FBI Counterintelligence Agent and is the author of What Every BODY is Saying: An Ex-FBI Agent’s Guide to Speed-Reading People
Once more we were horrified to learn, this past week, that a young man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, allegedly tried to blow himself up on board a US bound aircraft and that there had been warning signs which were ignored.
There are perhaps always warning signs or pre-event indicators, as we call them (travel, chatter, messages left behind) in terrorism cases, but none are more telling than these two: (1.) subscribing to an uncompromising ideology which seeks to use violence to achieve its goals and (2.) isolation.
Christmas day we saw a powerful example of how unyielding violent ideologies and isolation combine. It could have turned out differently if not for the heroic efforts of fellow passengers. In this case, we were fortunate enough to have a caring father who saw his son being “radicalized” (to an unbending ideology) and who became psychologically and physically isolated which caused his father to sound the alarm. Unfortunately and potentially disastrously, it went unheeded by those who should have known better. It is for that reason that I resurrect this article (in parts) which I wrote back in 2003.
Much has been written elsewhere about what can happen when we believe in an unyielding ideology (Inquisition, Nazism, Pol Pot, KKK, the list is endless). What has not been talked about at length is the psychological isolation that first takes place and then the physical isolation which when combined with a powerful ideology, makes for a very dangerous individual in the same way that Theodore John Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, Usama Bin Laden, and Timothy McVeigh, became metastable and even more dangerous when they self isolated.
These two components form a very dangerous admixture, as evidenced by the allegations now made against Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab by the Federal government. Because, once a terrorist isolates he has reached the final plateau, the springboard to terror. At this juncture the terrorist is at the mercy of his whims or the powerful effects of group dynamics (such as from Al Qaeda). In either case, this is the final, most significant phase for the terrorist. It is here that the terrorist becomes metastable; from here anything is possible, including blowing yourself up.
I hate to be too critical, but the minute that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s father went to the American embassy and told them about his son’s belief system (unyielding ideology which promotes violence) and his self isolation with others like minded, our intelligence services should have been robustly mobilized because the intelligence community has known of this dangerous phenomenon for a very long time.
For those not familiar with this phase of terrorist assessment I present the following, based on my book Hunting Terrorists: A Look at the Psychopathology of Terror
Isolation: A Key Factor to Profiling Terrorists
Within the would-be terrorist or proto-terrorist are a multitude of thoughts, fears, and issues which have to be resolved. These thoughts and sentiments often put the terrorist at odds with society, with friends, with family, and especially with the law. This process of synthesizing and distillation requires time to contemplate so that permissive beliefs can be fully embraced. The thoughts of the would-be terrorist percolate to the surface beginning the differentiation process from the rest of society. Social norms may be called into question, extremist views are nurtured, and violent action is ideated. These views resonate well within the terrorist but not with family and friends who, like most people, eschew extremes and violence. In due time, the proto-terrorist senses that he is different and that society is not indulgent of his thoughts and ideation, and so the isolation and withdrawal process begins. Mental isolation transforms into spatial and social isolation.
Isolation permits the free expression of ideas, especially those which are extreme and which foster passionate hatred. But it comes at a price, soon the activist or neo-terrorist becomes physically isolated not just mentally isolated. In this cocoon of isolation the terrorist can indulge his ideology without the restrictive routines and confines of daily life.
A study of this phenomenon is best illustrated by examining two all too familiar American terrorists Ted Kaczynski and Timothy McVeigh. The evidence shows that in both of these cases their thoughts diverged from those of their families and friends, leading them to be little understood by those closest to them. During this transitional period, both sought to refine their thoughts and later to pursue their passions in isolation. One remained stationary in Montana (Kaczynski) the other (McVeigh) restlessly traversed the Midwest (Dyer 1998, 223-227). They both communicated to family and friends their concerns, vision, and fears, finding little sympathy. Thus they pursued a relatively isolated life, where there were no arguments or restraints on their ideation. In isolation they perfected their twisted views without the inconvenient restraints of reality (Dees 1996, 150-170). In this isolation, violence was woven into a schema where bombs served as a “magical” solution to what they both perceived to be a crisis.
It appears that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab mirrored this paradigm, if we are to believe all the early reporting on his behavior prior to this week.
Transition to Terrorism
While terrorists are still in this formative-transitional stage, distilling their passions, deciding what to do, reaching out to others, it is a perfect opportunity for family and friends to intervene. Obviously many times the family does not know and may not have a clue, nevertheless, this is where law enforcement can interject themselves and solicit the assistance of family and friends. This kind of action may not lead to a conviction or a prosecution but it may prevent a terrorist act. In the case of McVeigh and Kaczynski, if friends and family had intervened at this point perhaps hundreds of lives would have been saved. In each of these cases the record shows that family or friends knew or suspected something; the ideation and passion by these two individuals was palpable (Dees 1996, 157). Exactly what we saw with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and his father according to published reports.
If isolation can be prevented so that rational thoughts and positive influences can prevail, often this is all that it takes (Post 1992, 37-38). For once the individual either self isolates or is taken in by other “True Believers,” it is too late. In all likelihood the individual will go forth and meet the violent expectations of the group, the psychological effects and dynamics of the collective are just simply too powerful (Hoffer 1951; Post 1992, 37-39).
We have seen this similarly in the United States with the “militias” (nothing more than extremist groups) in the 1990’s which isolated themselves in Michigan, Arkansas, Florida, Texas, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon (Dyer 1998, 275-285; Lacayo 1996, 24-27).
Once isolated within the confines of the group there is usually an initiation process which binds these individuals together. In anthropological terms this is a “rite of passage.” After their initiation, training, and indoctrination, these individuals are transformed and mutate into something mythical (Juergensmeyer 2000, 223). After this they are “freedom fighters,” “revolutionaries,” “jihadists,” “martyrs,” “heroes.”
This initiation process is also the glue that binds, affixes, and guarantees their commitment in the future to the organization. In relative isolation with other terrorists, beliefs are strengthened, discipline is instilled, training is facilitated, and new skills (e.g., firearms, explosives) are acquired (Combs 2000, 108). Within the terrorist camp or cell, the terrorist feels part of something greater, he feels whole, perhaps for the first time in his life. This is very fulfilling for the unfulfilled as they become in the words of Joseph Campbell, the mythologist, “archetypes.”
In isolation, the relative merit of each individual is determined through a vetting process unique to each terrorist organization (Combs 2000, 108-109). Some are more rigid and stringent than others. Obviously, not all terrorists are up to the same task. Large terrorist organizations have the capacity to pick and choose the best and brightest to insure that limited human resources (terrorists) are most effectively utilized. The 9/11 Commission Report speaks at length about the long process of selection and training that the al-Qaeda hijackers underwent prior to 9/11 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Ragavan 2004, 11-19). That is not that unusual. Terrorist organizations don’t want to waste talent unnecessarily either.
Training follows the vetting process, which allows for the personal abilities and agilities to surface. Those that are proficient with firearms become the snipers, assassins, or marksmen. Those who feel comfortable around explosives learn to create improvised explosive devices (IED), so essential to modern terror. Those that evolve a hands-on approach perfect the morbid art of manual assassination through stabbing and beheading. Others, less talented, are merely used as transportation platforms for bombs (IED’s) which they will detonate upon themselves as is alleged in the Abdulmutallab case by the government. While others will serve as couriers, administrators, communicators, and go-betweens (Combs 1997, 105-126; Moreau, et al. 2004, 30-21). Like a corporation, terrorists will find a niche, a way to contribute to the cause in their own way.
With training and coaching, the terrorist is soon ready to move on, to act out, to terrorize. Before each terrorist act, there is one final phase of isolation. Not mental isolation but rather the necessary isolation from society to commit the terrorist act. This usually requires some sort of hiding out while preparing. In the case of the Puerto Rican nationalist group the Macheteros, they would go to a “safe house” before each operation. Here they would spend the final few days getting mentally prepared, cleaning weapons, readying their equipment, rehearsing their final actions, making sure no one was on to them. Both Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski also went into hiding just before they struck. It appears that the alleged terrorist, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, did the same thing in Yemen.
Once operations are planned, coordinated, approved by higher authority, and rehearsed, then it is time to act. Functional isolation at this stage is necessary. The terrorist needs to separate from others and arm himself for the task. All terrorist acts require this final separation to carry out their deeds. Be it for a few hours or for a few months, this final phase is necessary because at this point that which has been concealed and guarded will soon come to light. Premature exposure or mistakes cannot be afforded. It is at this phase that it becomes dangerous for all concerned: the terrorist, the public, law enforcement. The terrorist is primed for action and any interference with the plan could have negative consequences. Weapons and explosives are in hand, devices have been armed, the terrorist is nervously on edge, paranoia is heightened.
At this stage it is too late, all that is past is prologue. The terrorist is singularly focused, energized and primed. At this point all that remains is the execution of the plan; death and destruction will follow. Which is why we need to focus on these two key criteria: subscription to an unyielding ideology that requires violence and isolation of the individual. These two components give us insight into the psychopathology of terror. Unfortunately in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab they were ignore, a mistake we can ill afford to make again, especially when there were pre-event indicators as well as the compelling warning by a concerned father.
Wired/Danger Room, 4 Jan 10: A near-successful bombing on Christmas, a suicide attack on the CIA — it’s been a rotten ten days for the U.S. Intelligence Community. And unless things change in a serious way, the spy agencies can expect many more rotten days ahead. But there are some steps that the IC can take in 2010 that could mean fewer failures, more success, and more lives saved. Think of them as New Years’ resolutions for the spy agencies. . . .
. . . . 4) Get Real About Training. Some of the most prestigious schools in the country give their knowledge away for free. But analysts have to cut throats, practically, in order to take these advanced courses in cultural, military, and intelligence studies. The armed services have offered correspondence and online education for years, because they recognize lifetime learning is important and that missions tend to get in the way of a normal schoolhouse routine. How come the information enterprise has yet to figure out that it should be offering the same options to its workforce so that they’re more likely to understand the issues and put out intelligent, meaningful content? Would an FBI special agent who was able to actually learn something about Islam (radical or otherwise) have been so quick to dismiss Major Nidal Hasan’s telling emails? . . . .
Washington Post, 4 Jan 10: The suicide bomber who killed seven CIA operatives in Afghanistan last week was a Jordanian informant who lured intelligence officers into a meeting with a promise of new information about al-Qaeda’s top leadership, according to two former U.S. government officials briefed on the incident. The informant had been working undercover in eastern Afghanistan for weeks, and had already provided U.S. spies with what one official described as “actionable intelligence” when he set the trap, the sources said.
In addition to the seven operatives, the bomb blast at a CIA base in Khost province killed a Jordanian intelligence official who had been assigned to work with the informant, the officials said.
The alleged bomber, identified as Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, was picked up in a vehicle a distance from the CIA base and apparently was not thoroughly searched before being brought into the compound, said one of the former officials, a veteran counterterrorism officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the incident remains under investigation. “He was someone who had already worked with us,” said the official, adding that the informant had been jointly managed by U.S. and Jordanian intelligence agencies. The CIA declined comment.
The name of the alleged bomber was first reported by al-Jazeera, which described al-Balawi as a physician from the Jordanian town of Zarqa, also the home of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the slain former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Jazeera reported that al-Balawi had been recruited to help track down Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian physician and No. 2 leader of al-Qaeda. MSNBC also reported that al-Balawi was the bomber. . . . .
